reflections

The Case of the Purloined Motive

The premise of Poe's story was that the way to hide something is to leave it in plain sight. With the current abilities of political organizations to manipulate media perceptions, the best way to hide a motive is to declare it.

Not having to go to work in an office every day, I have watched too much televised coverage of the war. It is an interesting study in media use. Each person and organization has it's own style.

For example, no one in the chain of command uses any term other than "coalition forces." It is never the British and us. The military demonstrated some minor participation of Danish and Polish participation. A Danish Officer was on stage at the first CENTCOM briefing and questions from Polish media about Polish military participation were answered. Even foreign journalists have taken to using that terminology, at least in the question period of those briefings. It shows the power of being able to use words to frame perceptions.

I am especially interested in the manner in which Donald Rumsfeld has conducted himself. When faced with questions of motive and or tactics, he has been exacting in telling as much truth as he believes needs be told. The level of distrust among some is so high that he can hide his motives, thoughts, perceptions by declaring them. When questioned about the installation of a new American backed regime in Iraq, Rumsfeld consistently says that this is "for the Iraqi people to decide." This is far from the media pundit perception that the Pentagon will install it's favorites (Chalabi) in such a government. The first action was to convene a meeting of many Iraqi religion, secular resident, exile leaders in Nasariya for the purpose of defining the process of recreating a new government. Like Rumsfeld said: 'It is for the Iraqi people to decide."

Journalists in the region, embedded or not, have focused first on the front line events, especially those with emotional impact such as the return of POWs, the conditions in hospitals, and then on the problems caused by unrest and looting after the fighting subsides. There are many stories that are NOT being covered.

According to General Franks, in areas where the "coalition forces" have had the time to work, water is flowing, hospitals are getting medicine and local government services are being restored by working with committees of local leaders. He stated that Um Qasar now has a better water supply than before the first Persian Gulf War. Unfortunately, the army that was able to direct its battlefield tactics with speed and daring in a results-oriented strategy has not had the capability to do so with follow on services. While the results appear to be correct, it took too long to unfold given the real conditions. I think that our forces just never conceived that hospitals and museums would be the target of looters.

The media has shown many pictures of the looted Iraqi National Museum. There is a general media focus on why the American Forces did not protect the museum. It is clear that American forces did not target the museum or any of the other important architectural sites. The most telling images are those of the director walking through the halls, pounding her own head with dis-belief and of another museum worker in tears. His words were translated as "What kind of a people are we?" Just a comment that has not been picked up on or followed by the media.

Another comment from a looter that was captured but not a focus of story. "I had no money, no food, no furniture in my house. Now I do." So what emotions allowed the Iraqi people to turn this looting on the very institutions that they so greatly need: was it just greed? pent up anger at authority? continued "thuggery" by those who had been doing this all along? There is a story here that will probably not be written in American journalism, but needs to be understood, because it happened in Haiti, East Timor, etc. and will happen again.

All of the TV networks have developed a sports coverage methodology of covering major events. There is a play-by-play announcer and a "color commentator" to explain what really happened. In the coverage of the war in Iraq, the commentary has been provided by retired military officers, college professors of Middle East Studies, think tank analysts and representatives of NGO's. It has generally been the case that much of the discussion of what will happen next has been wrong. The generals embedded in the media did not get it right when discussing the war plan.

The think tank pundits have been remarkably incorrect in describing what is going to happen and the more they go into detail, the more they error. It seems that their intent is more to forward their own position than to add to the knowledge of the viewer. I have found that their intentional distortions of fact is more misleading than journalistic omissions of facts. Everyone uses the media.

Given the range and complexity of events, there are few journalists who have the knowledge to make the explanations required for understanding of events. When they do, it is often wrong, as was Peter Arnett's ill-fated interview on Iraqi TV. When he moved from description to interpretation, he got it wrong. It is easier, less expensive, to rely on some experts with credentials for credibility.

These experts all have their own motivations and take advantage of their media attention to forward their own views. The result is that the media gives us a crazy quilt of conflicting views that takes a real effort to understand. Most viewers do not have the time and may turn off completely, just go with the emotional impact of the images or only pay attention to those sources with whom they already agree. These are not paths to understanding.